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[T]he fact that the system . . . was used in both intrastate
and interstate commerce did not derogate from the application of
Section 605 to the particular telephones or telephone lines referred
to in the indictment.22
Turning to the wording of section 10(b) itself it is clear that the
transaction need not be interstate just as long as some "means or instru-
mentality of interstate comerce" 23 is in some way involved. It is also
significant that when Congress wrote the comparable Section 17(a) of the
Securities Act of 193324 the wording used was "use of any means or instru-
ments . . . in interstate commerce."(Emphasis added.) This language seems
to direct the kind of "use" test that the Rosen court proposes. But in sec-
tion 10(b) Congress has changed this wording to "use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce."26 (Emphasis added.) This would
indicate that Congress was shifting its aim from the incidental use to the
instrument itself. In this light the telephone is indisputably an instrument
"of interstate commerce." These several factors indicate that when future
courts reach this cross-road they will undoubtedly be inclined in the direction
of the Nemitz decision.
JOHN F. DOBBYN
Taxation—Calculation of Corporate Earnings and Profits—Cash Basis
Association—Accrual of Federal Taxes Due in Determining Earnings
and Profits.—Demmon v. United States.'—The plaintiffs received and paid
taxes on a trust distribution and now seek to recover a refund. The Tax
Court had determined that the distributing body, Land Trust, which had
computed and paid its taxes at trust rates, was an association taxable at
corporate rates. 2 The court disallowed its distribution deduction and asserted
a substantial additional tax for the years in questions In any one of the
years under examination, the amount of cash available for distribution out
of earnings and profits would have been less than the amount actually
distributed if the additional federal taxes due on current earnings had been
deducted. The plaintiffs' yearly distribution from the trust was thus made up
of not only earnings and profits of that tax year, but also of payments from
some other fund-source of Land Trust (a distributing body which the
government was now treating as a corporation for tax purposes). Their theory
for a refund was that the difference between the amount distributed each
22 Id. at 55-56.
23 Supra note 3.
24 Securities Act of 1933 § 17(a), 48 Stat. 74 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1958).
25 Supra note 3.
321 F.2d 203 (7th Cir. 1963).
2 Estate of Scofield v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 774 (1956), affirmed on this issue,
266 F.2d 154 (6th Cir. 1959).
3 The substantial additional tax totaled $500,000 for the years 1945 to 1955.
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year and the amount that would have been available for distribution from
earnings and profits, computed by deducting the additional federal tax due,
would be a return of capital and non-taxable. The district court dismissed
the plaintiffs' suit; court of appeals reversed. HELD: the plaintiffs, who
received and paid taxes on the trust distribution, are entitled to a refund to
the extent the cash distribution did not come from earnings and profits, in•
that a "cash basis accounting" corporation is allowed to accrue federal taxes
due but not yet paid in computing earnings and profits.*
The question as to whether a corporation which uses the cash receipts
and disbursements method of accounting in computing its income subject
to tax, may then accrue federal income taxes in computing earnings and
profits has received varied judicial answers . 5 In Helvering v. Alworth Trust, 6
the court held that a cash receipts basis corporation in determining earnings
and profits for the year 1937 could not subtract the federal income tax due
for that year where the tax had not been paid. The corporate taxpayer could
deduct the federal tax paid in 1937 on the 1936 earnings.
An opposite result was reached in Drybrough v. Commissioner."' In the
latter case a deficiency had been determined against a cash basis corporation
on unreported income, which, it was discovered, had been embezzled by its
controlling stockholders. The Sixth Circuit agreed with the stockholders
that in determining what portion of the embezzled fund constituted a con-
structive dividend, the corporation could deduct the corporate tax deficiency
in computing earning and profits. Where, in other cases, the instant issue
has been examined, the result reached was determined by relying on either
Drybrough or Alworth.8
The courts which have allowed the accrual of federal taxes, including
the instant court, have yet to fully articulate the rationale for this position,
though indeed, one may be found. The 1954 Internal Revenue Code and its
predecessors have defined a dividend in terms of distributions of property
made by a corporation to its shareholders from earnings and profits.° To
the extent that a distribution is not a dividend it is treated first as a non-
4 E.g., Schwanbeck, The Accountant's Problem in Working with "Earnings and.
Profits" for Tax Purposes, 10 J. Taxation 22 (1959); Albrecht, "Dividends" and
"Earnings or Profits," 7 Tax L. Rev. 157 (1952); Rudick, "Dividends" and "Earnings
or Profits" Under the Income Tax Law: Corporate Non-Liquidating Distributions,
89 U. Pa. L. Rev. 865 (1941) ; Emmanuel, Earnings and Profits: An Accounting Con-
cept?, 4 Tax L. Rev. 494 (1949).
5
 Answering in the negative: Helvering v. Alworth Trust, 136 F.2d 812 (8th Cir.
1943) ; Newark Amusement Corp. v. Commissioner, 1960 CCH T.C. Mem. 705, 715;
Dean v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 256 (1947). Answering in the affirmative: Simon v.
Commissioner, 248 F.2d 869 (8th Cir. 1957); Drybrough v. Commissioner, 238 F.2d
735 (6th Cir. 1956); Hadden v. Commissioner, 49 F.2d 709 (3d Cir. 1931); Thompson
v. United States, 214 F. Supp. 97 (ND. Ohio 1962); Bender v. Commissioner, 1957
CCH T.C. Mem. 502, 518.
6
 Helvering v. Alworth Trust, supra note 5.
7 Drybrough v. Commissioner, supra note 5.
8 Supra note 5.•
9 Int. Rev: Code of 1954 § 316(a).
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taxable return of capital.'° To the extent the distribution exceeds the basis,
it is treated as a gain from the sale or exchange of property?'
Because the Code defines a dividend in terms of earnings and profits,
whether a distribution can qualify as a dividend depends on its being a dis-
tribution from earnings and profits. It is the plaintiffs' contention that
by accruing the additional federal income taxes due in computing earnings
and profits in any of the years in question, the amount of cash available
to qualify as a dividend was reduced and this amount should be treated
as a non-taxable return of capital. The merit of the plaintiffs' contention
depends on an understanding of the similarities and differences between the
statutory concept of taxable income and the concept of earnings and prof-
its. The latter, although used by Internal Revenue Code, is closer to an ac-
counting concept.' 2
 Upon recognition of these conceptual distinctions it is
possible to discover the rationale for the situation of a cash , basis taxpayer,
who, though prohibited from accruing debit deductions in computing its tax-
able income,13
 will be allowed to accrue federal taxes due, but not yet paid,
in computing earnings and profits.
The make-up of taxable income is rigorously defined by the Code with
an underlying policy of having the taxpayer clearly reflect his income. The
Code does not dictate the composition of earnings and profits with the same
rigor; this burden is left to the individual taxpayer." All will agree that
items determinative of taxable income do not necessarily coincide with those
items utilized in calculating earnings and profits. 12 Earnings and profits
are based on "actual net income and expenses.” 1 ° "The concept is much
closer to actual increases in earned surplus determined by the account-
ant'"? Items wholly or partially exempt from income are included in earn-
ings and profits such as tax exempt interest's and insurance proceeds on
the lives of officers of the corporation. 12
 Items which are disallowed as
deductions in computation of taxable income are nevertheless subtracted
in determining earnings and profits, e.g., federal income taxes2° and excess
charitable contribution. 21
The deduction of federal income taxes due but not yet paid by a cor-
porate taxpayer who uses the accrual method to report taxable income
presents no issue, for he is not disabled from deducting any due but not yet
79 Ibid.
11
 Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 301(c) (3)(A).
12
 Emmanuel, supra note 4. .
13
 Commissioner v. South Texas Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496 (1948).
14 Schwanbeck, supra note 4.
15
 Commissioner v. Wheeler, 324 U.S. 542, 546 (1945). The term "does not cor-
respond exactly to taxable income" and it "does not necessarily follow corporate ac-
counting concepts either."
16
 Surrey and Warren, Federal Income Taxation 1238 (1960 ed.).
17
 Ibid.
18
 Charles F. Ayer, 12 B.T.A. 284, 287 (1928).
19
 Rudick, supra note 4, at 880.
29
 Commissioner v. James, 49 F.2d 707 (2d Cir. 1931).
21
 R. M. Weyerhaeuser, 33 B.T.A. 594, 597 (1935). "Under the ordinary method
of accounting in computing earnings and profits there will be deducted . . . such items
as extraordinary expenses . . . charitable contributions."
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paid federal taxes. 22 A problem does arise, as in the instant case, where a
corporate taxpayer who keeps his books on the cash basis attempts to ac-
crue federal income taxes due but not yet paid in determining earnings
and profits. Regulation 316(a) 28 provides, in the interest of accounting
consistency, that the computation of earnings and profits be determined
by the same accounting method used in determining taxable income. There-
fore a cash basis association as the one in the instant case must utilize the
cash basis of accounting in determining earnings and profits. However, an ac-
countant in determining earnings and profits for a cash basis corporation
would accrue federal income taxes in determining the actual increase in
earned surplus.24
 It is from this conflict between the statutory language
and general accounting practice that reason and common sense prevail allow-
ing a corporation which determines its taxable income on the cash basis to
accure federal taxes in computing earnings and profits. It is difficult to see
how this result subverts the principle of accounting consistency between tax-
able income and earnings and profits.
If, in the instant case, the corporate trust were not allowed to accrue
federal taxes paid in years subsequent to when they were due, then the
only time they could make this deduction would be in the year during which
they were paid. Such a policy would allow the government to collect a
maximum tax from the corporate trust taxed at corporate rates and a maxi-
mum tax from the certificate holders by treating the entire trust distribu-
tion as ordinary income. Fairness requires that, if in substance what the
plaintiff received is a return of capital, it should be non-taxable. A distribu-
tion was made on the assumption that it was a trust distribution. A sub-
sequent court decision converted what had been labeled a trust distribution
into a dividend. With power of hindsight and a recognition of the economic
nature of earnings and profits, that portion of a distribution which exceeds
earnings and profits should be treated as a non-taxable return of capital.
In Drybrough, where the taxpayer acted wrongly he was allowed to
accrue federal taxes to determine how much of the embezzled fund was a
constructive dividend. In Demmon, the plaintiffs did not act criminally.
The denial to the taxpayers of the right to accrue their distributor's federal
taxes penalizes them when they have committed no wrong.
Unless there is an express statutory prohibition or policy prohibiting
a cash basis taxpayer from accruing federal taxes, the judicial rewriting
of section 31625 so as to allow accrual of federal taxes does not produce an un-
22 Commissioner v. James, supra note 20.
23 Treas. Reg. § 1.316-6(a) (1954).
24 Supra note 20, at 708.
In employing the phrase "earnings and profits" . . . we think Congress in-
tended to use the term in the ordinary accounting understanding, and, by
that practice, a corporation cannot be expected to have calculated any net
income in any year until provision is made for taxes accrued and payable to the
United States based on net income for the same year. Montgomery & Stout
Accounting Principles 308 (1923).
25 The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 § 316 defines a dividend as "any distribution
made by a corporation ... (2) out of its earnings and profits of the taxable year (com-
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desirable result. Exact logic has given way to the realism of the business
community, and the individual taxpayers have been given a "fair break."
EDWARD D. TARLOW
Contributor
Taxation--Social Security Taxes—Application of Income Tax Regula-
tions.—S. S. Kresge, Inc. v. United States. 1—This action was brought by
Kresge for refund of taxes, assessed under the Federal Insurance Contribu-
tions Act and the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, for the value of free meals
furnished by the employer-taxpayer to its fountain department employees. In
1954, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue had ruled that the value of the
meals did not constitute wages in FICA and FUTA computations. Subse-
quently, in 1957, the Commissioner reversed this ruling in answer to an
inquiry by the taxpayer, based on the intermediate passage of Revenue
Ruling 57-471.2 HELD: Income tax regulations are not applicable to FICA
and FUTA computations, and even if they did apply, the taxes were properly
assessed here since the meals were not given to enable the employees to per-
form their duties better during their normal working hours.
Section 119 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,9 regarding income
tax, reads:
there shall be excluded from gross income of an employee the value
of any meals or lodging furnished . . . for the convenience of the
employer, but only if—
(1) in the case of meals, the meals are furnished on the busi-
ness premises of the employer, or
(2) in the case of lodging, the employee is required to accept
such lodging on the business premises of his employer as a
condition of his employment. (Emphasis supplied.) ,
For meals to be excluded under subsection (1), all that is required is that
they be furnished on the employer's premises, and that the purpose served is
the convenience of the employer rather than the compensation of the em-
ployee.* The requirement of convenience has been deemed to be met when
puted as of the close of the taxable year ... )." (Emphasis supplied.) The court read the
words "as of to mean "as of one point in time"—the close of the taxable year. "Such
words las of] imply accrual...." Supra note 1, at 206.
1 218 F. Supp. 240 (ED. Mich. 1963).
2 Rev. Rul. 471, 1957-2 Cum. Bull. 630.
Mt is the opinion of the Internal Revenue Service that the furnishing of such
meals is recognized as part of the general understanding of the parties to the em-
ployment contract, and that as a practical matter of value of such meals is gen-
erally regarded as part of the employees' remuneration.
3 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 119.
4 Treas. Reg. § 1-119-1(a)-2 (1956).
Likewise, meals furnished will . . . be deemed to be for the convenience of the
employer if the furnished meals serve a business purpose of the employer other
than providing additional compensation to the employee.
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